China Policy Institute: Analysis


Politburo Standing Committee

Chinese Politics in Motion

Written by Jonathan Brookfield.

Last October, I wrote a short piece outlining three possible scenarios related to Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) succession at the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th Party Congress, an event which is slated to be held later this year.  There were two key ideas embedded in that piece.  The first was that Xi Jinping could not afford to simply follow institutional norms with respect to filling seats on the PSC, as such a strategy would likely lead to Hu Jintao affiliated individuals occupying a majority of PSC positions.  The second was that the degree to which this year’s PSC succession deviates from institutional norms will depend both on Xi’s political strength and his desire telegraph the extent of his power.  Given those two ideas, each of the three scenarios discussed represented a different degree of adherence to/deviation from institutional norms. Continue reading “Chinese Politics in Motion”

The Last Party Congress?

by Gordon G. Chang.

The 18th Communist Party Congress is now in the history books.  Will it be the last?

For many observers, the People’s Republic looks secure.  Yet after a troubled year—and an especially disappointing Party meeting this week—we should not be so sure.

Xi Jinping and the other six members of the newly constituted Politburo Standing Committee face many challenges at the moment.  All of them will test the new leaders, but there is one they can never overcome: a lack of legitimacy.

Simply stated, they were chosen out of the view of the Chinese people.  And to make matters worse, they also lack credibility.  Why?  One man, the 86-year-old Jiang Zemin, was hugely influential in crafting the makeup of the Standing Committee.  As a result, so-called conservatives now occupy at least four and maybe as many as six seats on the seven-member select group, dashing widespread hopes for reform.  “The backlash against Jiang Zemin will be overwhelming,” predicts noted China watcher Cheng Li of the Brookings Institution.  “The public resentment will be very strong.” (link of this source)

And resentment will probably get worse.  For three decades, the primary basis of the legitimacy of the Communist Party has been the continual delivery of prosperity.  Yet China’s economy is stumbling.  It is not growing at the 7.4% rate that Beijing claims.  Electricity production statistics—historically the best indicator of Chinese economic activity—manufacturing surveys, and price indexes point to an economy growing in the low single digits, perhaps as low as one or two percent.

And this is not just a cyclical downturn.  The principal conditions that gave rise to China’s extraordinary boom—9.9% annual growth for three decades—no longer exist.  The country is no longer reforming, the international environment is not benign, and the “demographic dividend” has turned into a bust.  So the economy has entered into a new “supercycle,” except this time the direction of the trend is down.

In this context, the new Standing Committee assignments are downright mysterious.  The last-ranked member, Zhang Gaoli, is tipped to get the economics portfolio and eventually become executive vice premier.  If so, the prospects for reform look bleak.  If Zhang does not get this portfolio, it could go to another conservative, the No. 3-ranked Zhang Dejiang, a North Korea-trained economist.  “If anyone represents the old SOE industrial model, it’s Zhang,” says Beijing-based Robert Blohm to the Washington-insider Nelson Report.

The person who should be named executive vice premier is Wang Qishan, the famed economics troubleshooter.  Mr. Wang, however, is taking over the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as the 6th-ranked member and becomes the country’s top anti-corruption official.  “This is going to be a huge waste of his strength in dealing with economic, financial matters, and foreign affairs,” noted Bo Zhiyue of the National University of Singapore (link of this source).

Some analysts believe Xi Jinping will tackle the economy with gusto, but that’s unlikely given the lineup of his fellow Standing Committee members and the rise of entrenched economic interests.  And even if General Secretary Xi pushes forward change, one has to wonder how effective he can be.  Political reform is difficult to envision in today’s Beijing, as Hu Jintao’s 18th Congress work report made clear.

There is growing recognition that the economy has gone just about as far as it can within the existing political framework.  If this perception is correct, then no political reform equals no long-term economic growth.

And we can all guess what no long-term growth means for an organization that has to prove its right to rule every day.

Gordon G. Chang is the author of The Coming Collapse of China and a columnist at  Follow him on Twitter @GordonGChang (

Opinions expressed in the CPI blog do not represent the views of the China Policy Institute or the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Nottingham. They are the personal views of the bloggers/authors.

The New Leadership Line-up Favours Tested and Pragmatic Officials

by Zhengxu Wang.

It’s official now. The new Politburo and its Standing Committee are out. Besides Xi Jiping and Li Keqiang, the Standing Committee includes another five men (in their ranking order): Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan, Zhang Gaoli.

On the surface, this line-up shows seniority is prioritized over other criteria. The five new members are all more senior than those potential selectees who eventually did not make it. Zhang, Yu, and Liu have all served two terms in the Politburo, while Wang has served one term in the Politburo plus one term as a vice premier.

Zhang Gaoli, while having served only one term in the Politburo, has been on the Central Committee as a full member for two terms. The other two contenders, Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang, have only served one term as full members of the Central Committee.

So, at least the Party maintained a consistent rule in making the choice this time. An argument can be made that applying this rule has led to the exclusion of younger, more reformist, and more enterprising officials, such as Li Yuanchao and Wang Yang.

But a deeper examination of this line-up shows that in governing a complex society and economy like China, hard-gained experience and pragmatism will be more critical than campaign fanfares and slogans.

All of the five new members, with the exception of Liu Yunshan, have had long careers in very challenging posts. Zhang Dejiang, for example, served as the Party Secretary of Zhejiang and Guangdong, China’s two economic powerhouse provinces. He has served one term as the vice premier in charge of industrial policy, and was called to take over Chongqing at a time when mismanagement of the municipality could jeopardize the whole succession process of the Party.

Zhang Gaoli ran Shenzhen City for many years. Several officials who ran Shenzhen had fumbled over corruption or other misbehaviour. One previous mayor of Shenzhen was even given a life sentence. But Zhang emerged as capable and clean, without making any serious mistake, and was moved to be in charge of Shandong Province, and then later Tianjin. In Tianjin his record has been well noted, as the city became a new centre of economic boom for the country.

The same could be argued for Wang Qishan and to a lesser extent Yu Zhengsheng. The latter has received very positive assessments by residents in Hubei and Shanghai, where his last two posts have been. In fact, he would have been promoted much earlier had his career not been affected by a family scandal earlier that involved his brother.

By contrast, those who tend to generate loud campaigning messages are often deemed as inexperienced and too ambitious.

Therefore, although the Party’s deliberation and horse-trading seems to discriminate against those openly enterprising and risk taking officials, it does seem to reward those who are more tested, seasoned, and pragmatic managers of state and economic affairs.

Zhengxu Wang is Deputy Director of China Policy Institute.

Opinions expressed in the CPI blog do not represent the views of the China Policy Institute or the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Nottingham. They are the personal views of the bloggers/authors

Blog at

Up ↑

%d bloggers like this: